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Abstract
Despite the centrality of political opposition in democracy, limited theoretical research has been conducted on this issue 
since the 1970s. However, the previous context of conceptualizing has dramatically changed. This article offers a new 
perspective on political opposition in contemporary democracies. After a critical review of the classic and contemporary 
literature on the subject, it proposes a renewed definition of opposition that better grasps the complexity of political op-
position in democracies. In addition, the article proposes setting a new agenda for future research on political opposition. 
As Schapiro put it in one of his famous works, “it is per-
haps too obvious to require stating that the process 
of government must be studied not only in the light 
of what those with power under their control try to 
do and actually achieve; but also with regard to those 
who oppose those aims, or whose interests and resist-
ance have to be conciliated before those in power can 
act” (Schapiro 1966: 2). Indeed, one of the fundamental 
bases for the development of democracy is the recog-
nition of rights for political and social actors to publicly 
criticize and challenge the government, its actions, and 
policies (Helms 2008 a: 6-19). In this perspective, who-
ever is interested in studying democracy is compelled 
to tackle, in one way or another, the question of politi-
cal opposition (Zellentin 1967: 416-435), which one of 
the greatest political theorists of our times has defined 
as the first axis constituting polyarchies, alongside the 
inclusion/participation axis (Dahl 1971). Hence, it is not 
surprising that the topic has drawn the attention of 
numerous scholars who have dealt with the question 
from different perspectives.1 
1 We can roughly distinguish five branches of the litera-
ture that focused on the topic: political theory –e.g. Dahl (1966), 
Sartori (1966); Schapiro (1972) ; Ionescu and De Madariaga (1968); 
comparative politics –see Blondel (1997); Helms (2004); transition 
However, despite the very wide range of studies deal-
ing with the notion of opposition, it also appears strik-
ingly that, since the seminal works of Dahl (1966), Io-
nescu and de Madariaga (1968), and Schapiro (1972) in 
the late sixties and early seventies, political opposition 
has generally “been studied within a larger framework: 
as a co-subject, usually included in the study of power, 
government, parliaments, parties, social movements” 
(De Giorgi 2007: 7). Forty years later, the remark of Io-
nescu and de Madariaga (1968: 2) still holds true: “very 
few works have ever dealt with [opposition] specifically 
and exclusively”. This lack of studies is even more bla-
tant when it comes to theoretical contributions (Neu-
nreither 1998: 423). Except for the chapters of Blondel 
(1997: 462-486) and Helms (1997) most of the works 
on opposition have indeed been case studies lacking 
theoretical inference and Dahl and Ionescu’s works 
remain the benchmark in comparative studies on the 
subject (Pulzer 1987). This observation, which is already 
as such an incentive to reconsider the question from a 
theories –Stepan (1997); Spence (2007) and case studies on non-
democratic regimes – Schapiro (1967); Mutalib (2000); Carbone 
(2003); Barber (1997) ; Franklin (2002); Leca (1997); Hlavacek and 
J. Holzer (2009); and social movements literature - see Weigle and 
Butterfield (1992); Kolinsky (1987).
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theoretical perspective, is reinforced by the fact that the 
context, in which opposition had originally been con-
ceptualized—Western democracies based on strong 
political parties acting in a supposedly powerful politi-
cal arena—has changed in dramatic ways. The democ-
ratization of ex-authoritarian states, the regionalization 
of unitarian states, the development of a supranational 
structure at the European level, and changes both in 
the executive-legislative relationships  (Andeweg 1992; 
Copeland and Patterson 1994; Costa et al 2002; Norton 
1990) and in the roles performed by parties  ( Katz and 
Mair 1995; Ignazi, Farrell and Römmele 2005; Poguntke 
and Webb 2007) are important reasons to consider new 
theoretical questioning on opposition. 
Finally, as shown in this article, most of the studies on 
opposition have tended to focus on limited dimensions 
of opposition and have used constricted approaches, 
hence engendering a narrow perspective (generally 
neo-institutionalist or functionalist) on the question of 
opposition as well as very restrictive range of research 
questions.
Starting from these observations, this article aims to 
offer a new perspective on political opposition. This 
article starts with a critical assessment of classical and 
contemporary literature on opposition. We argue that 
various dimensions, actors and types of relations have 
been neglected, due to three main biases: a normative 
definition of the opposition and its roles; a restricted 
definition of the actors seen as opposition actors; and 
finally, a narrow definition of the locus of opposition 
that is usually studied. In the second part, we propose a 
new definition of opposition and identify some fruitful 
avenues for future research.
This article does not cover all the aspects of “opposi-
tion” but rather focuses on the notion of “political op-
position”, hence including actors other than political 
parties but excluding non-organized actors as well 
as discontent expressed by individual actors outside 
the public sphere. Moreover, the aim is not to address 
the full issue of checks and balances in democracy. In-
deed, limiting the research object is a prerequisite if 
we want to provide a new definition and reflections 
on opposition. Finally, although we focus here on 
democratic regimes where the freedom of speech for 
opposition actors is recognized, we deliberately make 
some links with non-democratic regimes. The defini-
tion we propose could work both for democratic and 
non-democratic regimes and the research agenda 
could be useful for the study of democracies but also 
of the democratization process.
A critical state of the art: 
rethinking the notion 
of opposition
This section highlights the limits of existing literature 
on opposition. A first step (1.1.) is to focus on the way 
the “classic literature” studied the concept of opposition 
as this literature still constitutes the fundamental theo-
retical reference for contemporary scholars. The follow-
ing parts show both the legacy of the classic literature 
to contemporary studies, and the most important bi-
ases which the latter has engendered: a normative and 
a restrictive approach to opposition, in terms of actors 
(1.2.) and the opposition’s action repertoires (1.3.) that 
are studied as well as the sites of opposition considered 
by the literature (1.4.)
The contribution of classic literature
The concept of political opposition has rarely been rig-
orously defined. A study of classic literature on opposi-
tion provides a quite nebulous and extensive definition. 
Sometimes assimilated to checks and balances, to insti-
tutionalized conflicts, or to minority parties, opposition 
is not easily determined. Most often, the notion is used 
as a relative term, referring to a relationship: “standing 
in some form of disagreement to another body” (Nor-
ton, 2008:236). And indeed, Dahl defines it in a very 
simple way: there is opposition when B is opposed to 
the conduct of government A (Dahl 1966: 18), whereas 
Ionescu and de Madariaga (1968: 1) see it as “logically 
and morphologically.…, the dialectic counterpart of 
power”. However, despite this very broad and inclusive 
definition, the majority of classic scholars have tended 
to comprehend opposition in a rather restrictive and 
normative way. 
On the one hand, when classifying and studying po-
litical opposition in a more empirical way, classic au-
thors have generally attributed more emphasis to one 
specific kind of political opposition, namely the parlia-
mentary opposition, which was presented by Ionescu 
and de Madariaga (1968: 9) as the “most advanced 
and institutionalized form of political conflict”. On the 
other hand, historically and culturally embedded in 
the specific post-second World War context and that 
of the Cold War, this literature holds quite a normative 
dimension when discussing the “roles” or “functions” of 
opposition. Indeed, many classical scholars more or less 
implicitly differentiated a “normal” form of opposition, 
understood as “an organized political group, or groups, 
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of which the aim is to oust the government in power 
and to replace it by one of its own choosing” (Schap-
iro 1967), from its would be “deviant form”. Kirchheimer 
(1964) for instance distinguished three different modes 
of opposition:
“classic” or “loyal” opposition, offering alternatives to the 
chosen policies while recognizing the government’s 
right to govern and the constitutional system in place;
“principled” opposition, opposing both the policies of 
the government and the constitutional requirements 
of the political system; and finally, 
“elimination of opposition” where the minority group 
competes with the incumbent for power but cease to 
present alternative projects. 
During the same period, Sartori (1966) constructed an 
axis of opposition with a “real opposition” on one end of 
it and an anti-system form of opposition on the other. 
Following his words, the first one “presupposes consent 
on fundamentals, that is, consent at the community 
and regime level”, opposes “the government, not the 
political system as such” (Sartori 1966: 151) and acts qui-
etly and constructively, by opposing but not obstruct-
ing. In contrast, the anti-system opposition challenges 
the very legitimacy of the regime as it is and acts “ir-
responsibly” for it has no chance to be called to power 
and to exercise it. 
This perspective has clearly left its mark on the contem-
porary studies on opposition. A first consequence has 
been that most scholars have integrated a very limited 
range of actors under the label of “political opposition”. 
The second consequence has been to presume that op-
position actors only have very specific roles or functions 
and strictly defined objectives –taking power-, leading 
to a restrictive vision of the activities of the opposition. 
Thirdly, the definitions provided by the classic literature 
have led studies to envisage the first (and only) locus of 
opposition as being the parliament, hence narrowing 
the scope of analysis. These dimensions have engen-
dered a limited questioning in terms of research, which 
was further reinforced by the neo-institutionalist turn 
after the 1980s. 
Excluding actors from the study of opposition.
Starting from the classic premises that the opposition’s 
major and specific function would be to form an alter-
native government and to offer alternative legislation, 
the literature on opposition has excluded a range of op-
positional actors from the analysis. 
First of all, a majority of studies consider opposition as 
quasi-homogeneously composed of the minority par-
liamentary actors who failed to join the government 
(Helms 2008 a; Surel 2004: 163). This posture seems 
however very questionable. On the one hand, it seems 
insufficient to consider opposition only as a minority-
majority relation within the parliament, for many more 
possibilities of political opposition actors and relations 
can be envisaged. As Andeweg (1992) and Norton 
(2008: 244-246) have shown, drawing on King’s typolo-
gies, the relation of political opposition can indeed in-
clude a wide scope of situations: the opposition mode, 
which is the one where the majority opposes the mi-
nority; the inter-party mode which refers to an opposi-
tion from a party in the coalition; the intra-party mode, 
which is an opposition within a party against a policy, or 
put in other words, a “competitive factionalism” (Boucek 
2009); the non-party mode that involves different ac-
tors who unit independently from their party affiliation 
against a government policy; the cross-party mode, 
which refers to the processes or loci where political 
parties in opposition achieve consensus over specific 
policies. In that perspective, opposition includes much 
more than the sole relation between the minority and 
the government. 
On the other hand, an analysis restricted to the parties 
excluded from the government appears to be biased 
as the opposition is not only the government’s coun-
terpart. It is for instance very difficult to distinguish in 
a traditional approach the majority and the so-called 
“minority excluded from power” in the Nordic coun-
tries, where minority governments rely on opposition 
support (on an ad-hoc or more permanent basis) or in 
Switzerland, where opposition parties tend to be co-
opted (Christiansen and Damgaard 2010; Kerr 1978: 52). 
Similarly, the government-opposition divide does not 
appear within the EU system, where the parliamentary 
opposition structured around the pro/anti-integration 
dimension cannot pretend to come into power (Brack 
2010; Mair 2007: Neunreither 1998). This configuration 
is of course absent in non-democratic regimes where 
the impossibility to take power does not preclude the 
apparition of opposition forces (Carbone 2003). 
Secondly, following and simplifying classical typolo-
gies—especially that of Sartori—the literature on op-
position has quasi systematically differentiated regular 
and legitimate opposition from the so-called anti-sys-
tem parties. This has progressively led to the establish-
ment of two separate and very rarely connected fields 
of studies: on the one hand, that on mainstream parties 
acting as opposition parties in the parliament, and on 
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the other, that on “anti-system” parties, usually consid-
ered as protest actors using different modes of action 
in the political arena, and outside the parliament. For 
instance, on the basis of the classic premises on oppo-
sition, Norton contends that two broad categories of 
opposition exist: accepting the legitimacy of the state 
and agreeing to work in the structures provided by the 
constitution and not accepting the legitimacy of the 
state and opposing to it (Norton 2008: 236), hence crys-
tallizing the barrier between the supposed two existing 
types of opposition.
This a priori distinction between both types of actors 
seems inconsistent in many respects. From a purely 
theoretical perspective, we need to admit both the 
normativity and relativity of discriminating between 
“constitutional” and “unconstitutional” groups or be-
tween system and anti-system actors. As Dahl himself 
highlighted in 1973, when writing on the perception of 
opposition in hegemonic regimes: “if all opposition are 
treated as dangerous and subject to repression, oppo-
sition that would be loyal if it were tolerated becomes 
disloyal because it is not tolerated” (1973:13). This rela-
tivity but also the impact of the majority’s behaviour on 
these political forces was more recently further investi-
gated and confirmed by Kaufman (2011), who showed 
how the majority in Israel had contributed through its 
discourse and institutional tactics to establish Israeli 
Arab parties as “anti-system” actors. On the same issue, 
Pizzorno (1997) also showed the relative aspect of the 
labelling as anti-system, by demonstrating that a party 
(in this case, the Italian Communist Party) may be seen 
as seeking to obstruct the government, while the party 
defines itself as working within the system. Hence, a 
political actor cannot be considered as objectively anti-
system and what rather counts is whether these parties 
“are treated in practice, as ‘outsiders’…. regarded by the 
other parties in the system as unacceptable allies”(Mair 
1996: 93). 
From an empirical perspective, there is no justification 
either for including these opposition forces in a cate-
gory labelled as “anti-system”. Mair showed that in the 
case of the European Union, parties may be pushed to 
adopt an anti-system rhetoric due to a lack of rights to 
organize opposition within the system: “following Kirch-
heimer, in other words, we either submit and hence 
we accept the elimination of opposition, or we mobi-
lize an opposition of principle” (Mair 2007: 7). In addi-
tion. Ionescu and de Madariaga already pointed out in 
1968, we observe that parties which have a very critical 
rhetorical appeal against the system as a whole, in fact 
tend to compete in elections and, when elected, to “ac-
cept the rules of the game” (Ionescu and de Madariaga 
1968: 83). This was for instance the case of the French 
and the Italian communist parties, which despite their 
status of an “anti-system” party, contributed to the pass-
ing of many laws after the 1970s, amongst which con-
stitutional reforms and the transformation of economic 
structures (Pizzorno 1997: 649) This is also the case of 
regionalist parties that often play the democratic game 
and de-radicalize their agenda once they are represent-
ed in parliament (Elias 2009), or of some eurosceptic 
parties in the European Parliament that use the same 
modes of action as the other opposition parties (Bomb-
erg and Carter 2006; Brack 2010). Consequently, with-
out denying the relevance of studying these actors per 
se, it seems problematic when it leads to the creation of 
a conceptual barrier between these supposed outsid-
ers and the actors considered as the “real legitimate and 
institutionalized” opposition. 
A narrow perspective on the opposition’s 
action repertoires 
The influence of the opposition classical definition has 
also regularly engendered a restrictive and normative 
conception of the objectives and strategies of the op-
position and hence of its activities. In the narrowest per-
spective, opposition has been defined as highly institu-
tionalized, with a clearly defined and recognized status 
and whose role or “function” is to be the opposite of the 
government (Norton 2008: 237). The classical example 
is the Westminster model where the loyal Opposition 
in the House of Commons takes its role as an alterna-
tive government, “complete with shadow ministers, a 
shadow cabinet and at least the shadow of a legislative 
program” (Milnor and Franklin 1973: 423). In a less re-
strictive approach, authors have conceived opposition 
as the parties excluded from the government, whose 
primary function is to prepare an alternative govern-
ment and whose two major objectives would be con-
quering power (King 1976 cited in Norton 2008: 238) in 
the long run and influencing the legislative agenda in 
the short term. 
These basic assumptions first seem biased because of 
their normativity and their functionalist tendency to 
ask questions in terms of roles and functions. They are 
also empirically problematic as they lead scholars to fo-
cus on the influence of the opposition on the legisla-
tive agenda at the expense of the study of other strat-
egies and modes of opposition action (Special issue 
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of the Journal of Legislative Studies 2008; Mujica and 
Sanchez-Cuenca 2006). As more recent works under-
lined, opposition groups can have a multiplicity of ob-
jectives besides preparing for another government and 
offering alternative policies. For instance, in compound 
societies, the wish to channel the peripheral groups’ 
voice and concerns can surpass the willingness of the 
opposition to conquer power or to influence the leg-
islative process as such (Parry 1997). Opposition forces 
can also wish to play the role of a “safety valve” (Sartori 
1966: 150) by making the majority and the government 
responsive and accountable before the parliament and 
the people.2Instead of offering alternative policies, an 
opposition can also choose to collaborate with the ma-
jority to reform the system or to legitimize itself in the 
public sphere (Mujica and Sanchez-Cuenca 2006). For 
instance, authors noted in the case of the Netherlands, 
the tendency of opposition parties to oppose only a 
small proportion of the government’s proposals due to 
their capacity to influence the bills before the final vote 
(Andeweg and Irwin 2002). It can also act in order to 
politicize a contentious question, to give prominence 
to certain values and ideologies or to raise awareness 
within the public on a specific question. Finally, in some 
occasions, opposition actors can prefer, for ideological 
or tactical reasons, to stay outside the executive or even 
the parliament, in order to provide the citizens with an 
alternative vision of the regime. Hence, and depending 
on their long-terms and short-terms goals, opposition 
actors can mobilize a whole range of action repertoires, 
which should be taken into account. 
A closed arena: the parliament 
as the mainstay of opposition 
A third consequence of the normative stance vis-à-vis 
opposition is the very obvious focus of the literature 
on one particular site of opposition: the parliament. 
On this topic, Giulj (1980, 1981) went as far as to assert 
that “the development of an extra-parliamentary op-
position, if it prolongs over a long period, is a sign of 
dysfunction, which can jeopardize the whole system”. 
Recently, several authors like Blondel (1997) have en-
couraged researchers to look at the extra-parliamentary 
dimension of political opposition but, except some rare 
2 Lavau for instance developed the notion of a ‘tribune 
function’ (fonction tribunitienne) for the French Communist 
party: it can fuel the debate on some issues and make the 
citizens aware of some policies, through the use of the media 
although the party as such can not oppose or influence the 
governmental policy. See Lavau (1981) (in particular 342-356) 
and Lavau (1968).
exceptions (Kramm 1986; Dubrow and Tomescu 2004), 
most of the studies have continued to focus on the mi-
nority-majority relation within the national legislative 
arena, on the impact of institutional constraints on this 
relation and on the importance of these constraints on 
the participation in the legislative process (Holzhacker 
2005; Kopecky and Spirova 2008). However, if the parlia-
ment is the privileged locus for the institutionalization 
of political action in our contemporary democracies, it 
seems very limiting to consider the parliament as the 
sole place of political opposition action. 
Firstly, because the role and structure of the legislature 
are not the same across countries and the strategies of 
parliamentary opposition might vary according to the 
relative strength and functioning of the institution. In 
some cases, the codes and norms of conduct foreclose 
the expression of opposition within the chamber but 
these constraints set into motion various oppositions 
outside the parliament (Kerr 1978: 53). This element is 
especially relevant, in a context of multi-level govern-
ance (regionalization and supranationationalization), in 
which there are multiple institutionalized sites of oppo-
sition and centres of decision. This indeed affects the 
government and the opposition as well as their rela-
tions and dynamics (Friedrich 1996). 
Secondly, political parties and political actors in general 
also act as opponents outside the assembly. On the one 
hand, as has already been mentioned, opposition par-
ties represented in the parliament can act as an oppo-
sition force through extra-parliamentary tools besides 
the parliamentary ones. Consequently, as Kerr stressed 
(1978: 53), “an accurate portrayal of the patterns of con-
flicts and consensus within parliamentary arena must 
be sensitive to the patterns of political opposition gen-
erated by political activity outside Parliament”. On the 
other hand, political forces that do not succeed in being 
elected in the national arena can nonetheless continue 
to carry out oppositional activities. This is for instance 
the case for small or niche political parties, which fail in 
passing the electoral threshold or which compete only 
at one level of representation in multi-level systems, or 
for parties that deliberately choose to remain outside of 
the parliament. Despite their absence from the assem-
bly, they are still able to use the above-mentioned ex-
tra-parliamentary tools at their disposal to oppose the 
elites, the government and its policies or the regime. 
Thirdly, with the crisis of representation and participa-
tion, we can assume that political actors do not have 
the monopoly on the perception of being the sole “le-
gitimate representatives” of those opposing the gov-
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ernment. As Parry (1997) briefly mentioned, multiple 
oppositions can be found in lobbies and civil society. 
If the latter has been much analyzed as an actor of op-
position in democratization studies (Stepan 1997; Ko-
pecky and Spirova 2008), we should not overlook it in 
democratic regimes. 
Toward a renewed framework for 
the study of opposition
Without denying the relevance and the importance of 
the previous studies of political opposition, the main-
stream perspective seems, nevertheless, too restrictive 
for the above-mentioned reasons. In this part of the ar-
ticle, we offer a new framework for the analysis of op-
position. First we provide a renewed definition of the 
concept of political opposition. Afterwards, potential 
paths for new research questions are developed. 
Rethinking opposition: a new definition 
In order to both overcome the normative biases and 
the restrictive perspective on opposition, it is first nec-
essary to go back to the essence of the concept. On the 
basis of Dahl’s (1966, 1973) and Ionescu’s (1968) defini-
tions, there is opposition when actor A opposes actor 
B in government. We offer a definition of opposition 
that departs from its fundamental characteristic—i.e. 
its position towards the government. Taking the posi-
tioning (rather than the type of actors, the functions, or 
the supposed locus) of opposition as a criterion should 
allow us to adopt a renewed and more neutral vision of 
opposition which would not exclude activities, actors, 
or sites.
From these premises, we offer the following definition 
of political opposition: 
a disagreement with the government or its policies, the 
political elite, or the political regime as a whole, expressed 
in public sphere, by an organized actor through different 
modes of action 
We deliberately choose an inclusive definition of the 
concept of political opposition that remains relational 
but is not based on its functions, targets or objectives. 
Following the ladder of abstraction of Sartori (1970), this 
extensive definition allows a more inclusive and general 
concept from which configurative conceptualizations 
can be found by decreasing its extension and increas-
ing its intension. To reflect on this perspective, the unit 
of analysis of this contribution will not be referred to as 
“opposition” in the singular anymore but rather as “op-
positions”, hence implying a much wider spectrum of 
possibilities in terms of actors, relations and eventually, 
sites of action. 
Towards a New Research Agenda 
on political oppositions 
Starting from this broader definition of oppositions, we 
offer new research questions that should be able to 
overcome previous limitations: the barrier between the 
studies of anti-system and “normal” oppositions; the re-
stricted view on the opposition action repertoires and 
modalities of action, and the sole focus on the parlia-
ment as a site of opposition. 
Firstly, in order to overcome the pre-cited normative 
postulate which takes for granted the existence of a 
“normal” form and of “normal” objectives of the oppo-
sition, we decompartmentalize the literature on op-
position and on anti-system actors and we claim that 
the study of opposition should focus more on dynamic 
analysis. In contrast to the usual perspective that has 
led scholars to study anti-system actors as deviant 
ones, we offer a new track in the study of these actors. 
More precisely, along with Mair’s (1996: 93)  claim that 
“‘anti-systemness’, like beauty, [here] lies in the eyes of 
the beholder” we argue for the need to further analyze 
the precise effects of perceptions induced by labelling 
processes on opposition actors in general and on so-
called anti-system actors in particular. Building upon 
existing studies, we argue that being labelled as either 
“pro-system” or “system-rejective” (Shtromas 1981) by 
actors such as the political majority, the legislation, the 
courts, or the media. may have major consequences on 
these actors. Amongst these can be: a direct (de-) le-
gitimizations process of these actors vis-à-vis the public 
(Mutz 2007); a consequent process of self-redefinition 
of these actors; and finally, the resort to specific strat-
egies and modalities of action. Indeed, Bale (2007) for 
instance demonstrated that the quasi-institutional ex-
clusion of extreme rights parties through the estab-
lishment of a “cordon sanitaire” had tended to produce 
unintended consequences such as the adoption by 
these actors of a martyr rhetoric and image, which in 
turn reinforced their anti-establishment posture. These 
findings confirm the very relational dimension of the 
“anti-system” form of opposition already stressed by 
Dahl (1966, 1973) and Mair (1996) amongst others but 
also emphasize the importance of perceptions and self-
perceptions on the stances, modalities of action and 
strategies—including amongst others rhetorical strate-
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gies (Trenz and De Wilde 2009)—that are resorted to 
by opposition actors. These insights should encourage 
further research on the impact of labeling, perceptions, 
and self-perceptions on the oppositions. 
Secondly, to better grasp all kinds of oppositions, their 
modalities and sites of action, it is necessary to con-
sider the parliament as a site with permeable borders 
involved in social dynamics and likely to build on extra-
parliamentary forces and vice versa. Some recent works 
have indeed demonstrated that in the context of de-
pillarization, non-parliamentary oppositions could turn 
into competitors of parliamentary oppositions or have 
an impact on the parliamentary chain of governance 
(Andeweg et al 2010: 84; Christiansen and Damgaard 
2010: 50), underlying the interdependence between 
parliamentary and non-parliamentary oppositions. 
More substantial to our questioning, other studies have 
enlightened that opposition coalitions could very be 
well formed between parties and extra-parliamentary 
forces like social movements (Crespy 2010a; Tarrow 
1994). 
Drawing on these insights, we encourage studying to 
what extent parliamentary and extra-parliamentary op-
positions have complementary or competitive strate-
gies; how they collaborate and to what extent one type 
of actors build on other opposition actors (for instance, 
how parliamentary forces mobilize citizens and vice 
versa), or tools in order to make its claims heard. In this 
perspective, the focus on language and rhetoric is one 
possible path to follow. One of the main characteristics 
of democratic politics is indeed its distinctive medium 
of decision-making: deliberation, which implies that 
decisions are taken through a process of contradic-
tory discussions and debates (Rousselier 1997: 17-19; 
Schelder 1996). Whereas the literature on anti-politics 
and populist actors pays attention to language and 
rhetoric, it has generally been overlooked by studies 
on opposition. However, a more systematic and thor-
ough analysis of language and rhetoric could lead to 
a better understanding of oppositions, including their 
strategies and modalities of action. Acknowledging the 
importance of language, Crespy (2010b) for instance 
showed on the basis of discursive institutionalism, how 
the frame of “democracy” and “social Europe” played the 
role of common denominator, which rendered possible 
an opposition alliance against the Bolkestein Directive 
between parties in the parliament together with social 
movements. This kind of studies would be worth being 
developed further.
Another possibility would be to grant more attention 
to the nature and the saliency of the issues debated 
in the political arena. Several authors indeed demon-
strated the relevance of issues as a key variable for the 
study of opposition in the parliament. Kerr for instance, 
categorized oppositions along issues, showing in the 
Swiss case that they can lead to different types of oppo-
sition (Kerr 1978). De Giorgi (2007), Mujica and Sanchez-
Cuenca (2006) for their part, showed empirically how 
parliamentary oppositions can behave and react differ-
ently in their votes and collaboration with the majority 
depending on the nature of the issues that are debated. 
Holzhacher (2002:472), studying the case of the Neth-
erlands, finally displayed the presence of temporary 
“floating coalitions” between some parties of the gov-
ernment and members of the opposition in parliament 
to change the government proposals, notably on Eu-
ropean issues. It would be relevant to further develop 
this perspective to question the impact of issues on the 
emergence of political oppositions within and outside 
the parliament, on the alliances between oppositions, 
and on the repertoires of action.
A last possible track of research, which could help go 
over the parliamentary boundaries and better grasp 
the interconnections with the extra-parliamentary 
sphere would be to focus on the ways in which oppo-
sitions mobilize parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
tools, channels and actors. For instance, the interrela-
tion of opposition forces with organizations outside 
the parliament or with the media, which can constitute 
a powerful agent in agenda-setting (McCombs 2004; 
Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006), should deserve more at-
tention. However, the way demonstrations or referenda 
are used to oppose specific government policies would 
also deserve more attention. Direct democracy tools 
have indeed been used by opposition actors in order 
to mobilize the population against the government on 
specific policies such as European issues, environment 
or ethics (Andeweg, De Winter and Müller 2002; Bomb-
erg 2001; Papadopoulos 2001). Developing these topics 
could provide us with a more in-depth comprehension 
of oppositional strategies. The reverse question could 
also be asked, i.e., how do extra-parliamentary actors re-
sort to parliamentary opposition means. This question 
requires further research and study.
Finally, the context in which opposition has been theo-
rized has significantly evolved and one notable change 
affecting oppositions deals with multilevel governance. 
In order to better grasp the range of oppositions’ mo-
dalities of actions, following Friedrich (1996) we argue 
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that the effects induced by federalism and multi-level 
governance on opposition forces should be consid-
ered. Despite the seemingly narrow interest in political 
parties, broad spectrums of questions arise from the 
different levels of power and opposition. For example, 
in the case of incongruent coalitions, where a party is 
governing at one level and opposing at another, the 
impact of this configuration on opposition can be ana-
lysed. Indeed, as has been shown in the case of political 
parties in multilayered political systems, the existence 
of different levels of power can lead to different choices 
of strategies of representation (Deschouwer 2005). In 
the same perspective, the analysis can show whether 
depending on the level of power, different spheres of 
decisions (supra or infra-national) lead to differentiated 
strategies, opposition coalitions, routes of influence 
(Braghiroli 2008; Raunio 2000), discourses, or percep-
tions by the public. 
Conclusion
Despite the very common use of the notion of “op-
position”, few articles have concentrated on this top-
ic specifically since the 1970s and even less articles 
have provided a theoretical reflection on the notion. 
Moreover, most of the recent articles on opposition 
have analyzed it from a strict perspective, usually with 
a (neo-) institutional focus. Starting from this notable 
observation, this article offered a critical state of the 
literature on opposition in order to rethink the way 
this subject has been studied. A first step was to look 
at the classical research on opposition to assess its 
impact on the way contemporary scholars have ana-
lyzed this topic. We highlighted three frequent biases 
both present in classical and contemporary literature: 
a restrictive view on the actors understood as opposi-
tion forces; a normative and limited view of the oppo-
sition’s repertoires of action; and a restrained a priori 
on its locus of mobilization. 
Without denying neither the relevance nor the impor-
tance of studying the parliamentary opposition forces 
and its relations with the majority in power, such focus 
is on the one hand too constraining, especially in light 
of the developments that have taken place in the last 
decades and, on the other hand, often too normative 
being based on the allegedly “normal” functions that 
an opposition should fulfil. 
We offered a broader definition of opposition in order 
to better grasp its different components and dimen-
sions in terms of actors, sites of action and roles. In 
this perspective, the notion of opposition should be 
understood as a stance of disagreement expressed in 
the public sphere by mobilized actors, through differ-
ent modes of action, the target of discontent being 
the government or its policies,the political elite, or the 
political regime as a whole. The broadening of the def-
inition of this concept should allow overcoming the 
biases mentioned in the first section of this paper. 
Finally, on the basis of the proposed definition, new 
research questions have been offered, which take into 
account the critiques that we raised. Hence, we sug-
gest opening reflections on the role and impact of la-
beling and discourses on opposition actors, in order 
to get a more dynamic perspective on oppositions; on 
the elements (issues, representation of issues etc.) en-
gendering possible coalitions of oppositions crossing 
the parliamentary borders; and finally on the multi-
plicity of “opposition levels”. These new questions and 
perspectives may help overcome the underlined flaws 
of the literature and widen its scope to better grasp 
the complexity and multiple dimensions of contem-
porary oppositions.
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